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TIME

The CIA
Mission Impossible?



Intelligence Chief Stansfield Turner

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TIME/FEB. 6, 1978

COVER STORIES

Shaping Tomorrow's CIA

The embattled agency is opened up, aired out and trimmed down

Never before has a secret agency received such public scrutiny. It is indeed a unique event that a modern nation is exhaustively examining one of its chief weapons of defense for all the world to see—including its adversaries. Yet this unprecedented exposure of the Central Intelligence Agency is perhaps the inevitable result of attacks on a vast bureaucracy that operated too long out of the public eye. America's premier defense agency has been under intense fire both at home and abroad for violating what many critics felt were proper standards of international conduct.

Once a proud company of proud men acting with the confidence that not only would their accomplishments serve their country but that their fellow citizens would support them, the agency has found its very functions and rationale severely questioned. It has had five directors in five stormy years. Its chiefs seem to spend more time before congressional committees than in planning and administering. Its agents, never public heroes because of the secrecy of their work, are now portrayed in the harshest of press accounts as conspiratorial villains. Somehow the rules of the spy game changed and, as the CIA men keep telling themselves, changed in the middle of the game.

The result has been inevitable—sagging morale, deteriorating ability to collect intelligence, and declining quality of analysis. Increasingly, this has worried Government policy framers, who are all too well aware of the need for timely intelligence sources and evaluation.

It has also, not incidentally, comforted those who work against the CIA. A Soviet KGB agent told a TIME correspondent in Cairo last week: "Of all the operations that the Soviet Union and the U.S. have conducted against each other, none have benefited the KGB as much as the campaign in the U.S. to discredit the CIA. In our wildest scenarios, we could never have anticipated such a plus for our side. It's the kind of gift all espionage men dream about. Today our boys have it a lot easier, and we didn't have to lift a finger. You did all our work for us."

In an effort to restore the CIA's esteem, reorganize the U.S. intelligence community, and deflect further criticism from the agency, President Carter last week signed an Executive order that places all nine U.S. intelligence agencies under the direct budget control and loose coordination of one man: CIA Director Stansfield Turner, 54. Incorporated in the order were sharp curbs on the kinds of clandestine practices that brought the CIA much of its criticism.

The new appointment and the new directives were received with mixed emotions in the U.S. intelligence community. There was skepticism that the overall problems of intelligence, coordination and direction could be cured either soon or simply. In addition, since taking over the CIA last March, Admiral Turner has become one of the most controversial men in Washington. His unpopularity in his own agency stems in part from the brusque way in which he eliminated 212 jobs in the Directorate of Operations, the arm that deals with covert activities and intelligence gathering (the other arm handles analysis). The sackings reflected a longstanding desire to reduce the size of the CIA and scale down its covert operations.

It was the exposure, and to some extent the misrepresentation, of these covert activities that got the CIA into so much trouble. While zealous agents sometimes overstepped legal limits, the agency more often took the rap for activities that were ordered or approved by higher authorities. The abortive Bay of Pigs invasion was approved by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. It is still debated whether Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson knew of or supported assassination attempts against foreign leaders, such as the bizarre plan to supply poisoned cigars to Fidel Castro. L.B.J. approved Operation Phoenix, in which agents directed the killing of Viet Cong terrorists. In Chile, the CIA gave money and other help to opponents of Marxist Salvador Allende. But there is no evidence connecting the CIA to the coup that overthrew and killed Allende in 1973, though the episode gave the U.S. a black eye. The CIA's surveillance of American citizens was grossly exaggerated by much of the press. One clear abuse by the agency, which it apparently carried out totally on its own initiative, was experimenting with LSD and other drugs on unwitting victims.

Paradoxically, more is expected of the CIA just when its capabilities are being restricted. Last week, when a Soviet spy satellite broke up over Canada and invaded the atmosphere like a streak of fireballs, it served as a blazing reminder that the world remains a dangerous place, far from a Utopia where a democracy can conduct all its business openly.

Détente or no détente, the Soviet Union is a formidable antagonist that continues seeking power and influence, or at least the ability to apply pressure, all over the world. Spending a higher percentage of its gross national product on weaponry and troops than the U.S. does, Russia is striving to outstrip American military prowess in many areas. This means that a secret service capable of ferreting out Soviet intentions as well as capabilities is vital to U.S. security. Says Cord Meyer Jr., a much-decorated retired CIA official: "We need a very, very alert advance warning capability, not only for weapons but for times when Soviet leaders may have reached a decision or when they are tending toward a decision."

Good intelligence has made it possible to cooperate with Russia to contain the arms race. Mutual spying by satellite enables the U.S. and the Soviet Union to monitor the weaponry in each country and provide some prospect that the other side is not cheating. Says a State Department official: "The SALT initiatives would not have been possible without intelligence."

The rise of Third World forces has put an additional burden on American intelligence: Most of the new nations have authoritarian regimes that do not freely supply the kind of political and economic information that is routine in the West. If the U.S. expects to stay abreast of developments in these vast areas of the globe,

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

Entrance hall of CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., with agency seal on floor; inset: Admiral Stansfield Turner, the nation's intelligence chief

More need than ever for sharply focused political and economic analysis in a dangerous and increasingly complex world.

it needs a sophisticated and sensitive intelligence apparatus. Says a former deputy director of the CIA: "Totalitarian countries can use naked power; an open society has to depend on its wits." On top of the normal tensions of national rivalry, there is now the added danger of international terrorism. The U.S. has escaped serious incidents so far, but it needs intelligence to help protect its allies from this latest scourge of political fanaticism.

Among their responsibilities, the CIA and the other U.S. intelligence agencies have provided psychological profiles of such key leaders as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin. Intelligence has supplied background information to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on every step of his diplomacy in the Middle East. The CIA is probing the likely consequences of the French and West German elections later this year, the course of Sino-Soviet relations, the ethnic conflicts that could rend Yugoslavia after Tito dies, and the possibility of intervention there. Attempts by the U.S. to prepare for world political developments would be inconceivable without intelligence.

All this work is jeopardized if the intelligence community is unreasonably weakened by public attacks. Policymakers and intelligence officials abroad are especially worried that outside pressures could all but incapacitate the CIA. They fear that Americans are too susceptible to periodic bouts of moral outrage, that they fail to understand their cherished democratic freedoms must be protected from a world that in large part does not cherish them. Appearing on the *David Susskind Show* in January, Jack Fishman, a British expert on intelligence, said he was "appalled by the way the American public is falling into the trap of slander-

The Motto Is: Think Big, Think Dirty

When Soviet Cosmos 954 naval reconnaissance satellite plummeted from its orbit and disintegrated over northwestern Canada last week, it underscored an inescapable fact of the space age: we are never alone. Nor, for that matter, is the other side. Day and night, little is hidden from the intelligence-gathering techniques of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Information is plucked from space, from the ground, from under the sea. A rundown of some of the most sophisticated methods for gathering data:

SATELLITES. In 1972 the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed that a "national means of verification" could be used by both sides, without interference, to police arms control pacts. In plain English: spy satellites were legal.

The star of the U.S. spy satellite stable is the Lockheed "Big Bird," a 12-ton technological marvel orbiting as high as 250 miles above the earth. Big Bird, 55 ft. long and 10 ft. wide, is equipped with electronic listening equipment along with black-and-white, color and infrared television and still cameras. It is able to make a low orbital pass at an altitude of 90 miles and take extraordinarily detailed photographs, which give U.S. intelligence information on Russian and Chinese harvests as well as clues to secret weapon construction. On one mission over the Soviet Union, Big Bird snapped the make, model, wing markings and ground-support equipment of a group of planes stationed near Plesetsk, Russia's key military launch center. Exposed film is stored in six cannisters that are periodically ejected into the earth's atmosphere, descending by parachute toward a point in the Pacific Ocean north of Hawaii, where they are snatched from the air by a giant Y-shaped sky hook bolted to the nose of an Air Force cargo plane. If that fails, the cannisters float on or just under the surface of the Pacific, giving off radio and sonar signals, and are recovered by frogmen.

Big Bird's coverage, though steadily improving, is still limited by the amount of propellant aboard to about 220 days a year. Meanwhile, the Soviets have gained an intelligence edge by again manning their Salyut space station, which passes over the U.S. twice a day. U.S. intelligence officials believe the Russians are likely to keep cosmonauts in space from now on. American astronauts, on the other hand, will not revisit the Spacelab system until the new space shuttle is launched in 1980. The Soviets have another advantage in space: the "hunter-killer" satellite that can track an orbiting vehicle, sidle up to it, and detonate like a hand grenade, blasting its victim to bits. The satellite killer's main potential target: Big Bird.

PLANES. After the embarrassing U-2 incident in 1960, President Eisenhower promised the Kremlin there would be no more U.S. spy flights over the Soviet Union. Three years later, however, Lockheed unveiled another super flying machine that could probably make the trip with impunity: the needle-nosed SR-71 (for strategic reconnaissance), a 12-ton aircraft that travels three times the speed of sound at more than 85,000 ft. Armed with electronic "spoofing" gadgetry capable of disrupting enemy tracking systems and even wiping its own image off a radar scope, the plane is nicknamed "Blackbird" for its sooty heat-resistant paint job. The world's highest-flying and



Lockheed-built SR-71 spy plane, nicknamed "Blackbird" for its sooty coat of paint, the world's fastest and highest-flying manned aircraft

Plucking information from space, from the ground and even from the sea with gadgets limited only by the human imagination

Continued

ing and smearing its own security organization. The CIA may have made many mistakes, but that does not mean you should smash your own security in the name of freedom of speech. You can't destroy yourself."

Last week former CIA Director Richard Helms made much the same point: "If we treat people who do this kind of work as second-class citizens, we are not going to be able to get anybody to do our dirty work for us."

Most foreign intelligence officials do not think the damage has gone so far that it is not containable. Says a top West German intelligence officer: "The CIA's work is still very good, but it's not up to past levels. What the CIA urgently needs now is to settle down, get a clear sense of direction and confidence again. This is vital for all of us, not just those in intelligence work."

Carter's Executive order on intelligence is intended to restore this balance and confidence. The President said that his reorganization directive was the product of the most extensive and highest-level review ever conducted. Just under a year in the making, the order expresses a rough consensus among the intelligence and defense communities, the White House and Congress.

Carter, characteristically, had been hard to please. He returned four drafts to his staff for revision. Says a top Administration official: "Only practice will tell if the reorganization works, but there was plenty of anguished howling as well as celebration in drawing up the order." The controversy suggests that, like any other bureaucratic reshuffle, this one will work only as well as those involved want it to work.

The document aims to achieve greater efficiency by streamlining the intelligence community under Turner, and to curb misdirected actions by imposing new restraints on covert activities. Says David Aaron, deputy director of the National Security Council: "It was important to end once and for all the notion that ef-



DRAWING FOR TIME BY CAL SACKS

Artist's conception of U.S. "Big Bird" reconnaissance satellite

fastest manned airplane, the SR-71 can travel more than 2,000 m.p.h. Though the U.S. has honored Eisenhower's promise, in 1967, as Communist Chinese nuclear technicians triggered their first hydrogen bomb, they were stunned by a blip moving across the radar scope; Blackbird was photographing the whole show. The plane carries high-powered cameras that can map most of the U.S. in three passes, as well as three-dimensional filming equipment that can cover more than 150 sq. mi. so precisely as to locate a mailbox on a country road.

"BUGS." Last month the Pentagon warned defense contractors to be wary of what they said in messages carried by commercial satellites because the Soviets are listening to every word. Using innocent-looking vans or "ferret" satellites or balloon-supported towlines, trailing from submarines, that act as 2,000-ft. antennas, the Russians pick up microwave transmissions from telephones, radios and satellites. Last year they installed huge eavesdropping antennas near Havana to intercept messages sent from the U.S. overseas. At KGB headquarters in Moscow, 30,000 workers specialize in computer analysis of miles of taped transmissions. The U.S. can scarcely complain; some 4,000 Americans employed by the National Security Agency, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and secret private contractors are doing exactly the same thing. Both Soviet and American technicians use advanced computers programmed to react to trigger words; a Soviet analyst, for instance, might sit up straight on coming upon words like Cobra Dane, a new radar installation in the Aleutians, or Trident, the giant U.S. submarine now under construction.

Microwaves, the short radio waves that have been adapted to cook roasts and heat frozen dinners in compact kitchen ovens, are also used to bug conversations in nearby rooms or vehicles. Metal resonators buried around a room will vibrate from sounds in the air. The microwaves are bounced off the resonator, carrying the vibrations back to the eavesdropper's receiver. The spoken words are then reproduced electronically. Such gear has allegedly been used for a U.S. surveillance project called Gamma Guppy that has tried to eavesdrop on conversations conducted by members of the Soviet Politburo in their limousines. Another James Bondian device: a laser bug. The laser shoots a narrow stream of light against a window, which will vibrate from the sounds in the room; the beam grabs an "image" of the vibrations, which is then converted back to sound by a special receiver.

CAMERAS. If a spy wants pictures to go with the dialogue he has bugged, all he needs is an unobstructed view of his target, a little quiet, and either a Starlight Viewer with a camera adapter or an Intensifier Camera, both made by Law Enforcement Associates, Inc., a New Jersey electronics firm. Compact handheld devices, they retail for about $3,000 and can be operated along with earphones and a parabolic reflector or "dish" that can pick up normal speech up to 800 yds. away in an open space or in a room across a noisy street. The Starlight Viewer amplifies light 50,000 times and is perfect for nighttime surveillance; the intensifier needs some light but produces more sharply detailed photographs.

What the spy trade calls ELINT (for electronic intelligence) seems limited only by the range of the human imagination; it is a tinkerer's dream so long as intelligence wizards bear in mind the unofficial motto of space age spying: think big and think dirty. But all their gadgets, no matter how effective and sophisticated, are unlikely to make the man in the trenchcoat obsolete. Satellites and planes and bugs might dig up secret information faster, but HUMINT (for human intelligence) is needed to interpret it, and to decide what to do next.



BOB ADELMAN

Hand-held viewer used with "dish" eavesdropper

Day and night, little escapes the intelligence gatherers.

continued

fective intelligence can't be carried out within constitutional limitations."

Under the new Executive order, responsibility for CIA and other intelligence operations is clearly lodged with the President and his top aides. Presidential passing of the buck for any unsavory covert activities will now be much harder, if not impossible. The National Security Council remains at the top of the intelligence pyramid. Two of its committees, set up last year by NSC Director Zbigniew Brzezinski, will have expanded powers. The Policy Review Committee will continually examine all intelligence operations. Chaired by Turner, the committee will include the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense; the National Security Adviser; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Special Coordination Committee, chaired by Brzezinski, includes the members of the NSC, along with other senior officials who are chosen to attend. It will be responsible for special intelligence operations, thus sharing with the President the supervision of all sensitive covert activities carried out by the CIA.

This committee will also take over coordination of counterespionage, an activity that is handled by the FBI within the U.S. and by the CIA abroad. No one is sure how this change will work, since counterespionage has become the unwanted stepchild of intelligence. The FBI admits flatly it no longer has the manpower to keep track of all the Soviet KGB agents flowing into the U.S. and its efforts, like the CIA's, have been impeded by growing restrictions on surveillance. Admits one Carter aide: "Counterintelligence is still a mess. We haven't resolved anything except to deal with it in the classic bureaucratic sense: move the function and rename it."

The new set of prohibitions is extensive and severe. Perhaps most important, the Attorney General is drawn into the heart of intelligence to ensure a legal basis for all domestic operations. His approval is needed for an intelligence agent to open mail sent through U.S. postal channels, to join any domestic organization, or to contract for goods and services in the U.S. without revealing his identity. Surveillance of American citizens within the U.S. can be conducted by the FBI only in the course of a formal, lawful investigation; surveillance of a U.S. citizen abroad is allowed only if he is thought to be involved in some activity inimical to national security. The Attorney General is instructed to make sure that any "intelligence activity within the United States or directed against any United States person is conducted by the least intrusive means possible."

Assassinations are flatly prohibited. So is any experimentation with drugs, unless it is done with the subject's consent under Health, Education and Welfare Department guidelines. U.S. spies will not be permitted to join any other federal agency without their identity being disclosed—a directive that has drawn fire from CIA officials, who rightfully claim there are very few places left where their agents can get secure cover.

When last week's executive order was finally hammered out, Admiral Turner, perhaps only half in jest, threw up his arms, sighed and told Brzezinski: "They call me the intelligence czar, but you're the boss." The admiral had a point, but then he has nothing to complain about from the reshuffle. For the first time, one man has been told to take charge of the nine all too often freewheeling, intensely competitive and sometimes overlapping intelligence agencies.

Precisely how much power Turner will wield remains to be seen. The legislation establishing the CIA in 1947 gave the

INTELLIGENCE CONTROL



TIME Chart by Nino Telec

CIA
Budget: (1978) est. $800 million
Employees: est. 20,000
Mission: To collect foreign intelligence and provide support for other U.S. intelligence agencies. Domestic intelligence activities must be coordinated with FBI and have approval of the Attorney General.

FBI
Budget: $513 million
Employees: 20,000
Mission: To investigate federal crimes and conduct counterintelligence within the U.S., and coordinate such activities with other agencies.

National Security Agency
Budget: est. $1.2 billion
Employees: est. 24,000
Mission: To monitor U.S. and foreign communications coming from satellites, land-based transmitters and submarines. To break foreign codes and ensure the security of the Government's own communications.

State Department Intelligence
Budget: $11.5 million
Employees: 315
Mission: To collect—overtly—foreign political, economic, scientific and sociological information, and coordinate with the CIA director to ensure that U.S. foreign intelligence activities help U.S. foreign policy.

Defense Intelligence Agency
Budget: est. $200 million
Employees: 4,300
Mission: To provide and coordinate military intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and non-defense agencies.

Military Intelligence
Budget: Unavailable
Employees: Unavailable
Mission: To provide tactical and strategic intelligence and counterintelligence for each branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps), coordinating foreign work with the CIA and domestic duties with the FBI.

Treasury Department Intelligence
Budget: est. $926 million
Employees: Unavailable
Mission: To collect—overtly—foreign investment and monetary information, and produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to U.S. economic policy.

Energy Department Intelligence
Budget: $24.7 million
Employees: Unavailable
Mission: To produce and disseminate intelligence about foreign energy supplies, production, intentions and policies.

Drug Enforcement Administration
Budget: $188 million
Employees: 4,365
Mission: To collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign and domestic narcotics production and trafficking.

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director, as his title suggests, a certain degree of authority over all the intelligence agencies; he was charged with "coordinating" their activities. But he only loosely performed that function. The new executive order considerably enhances the director's authority and responsibility. He has control of the total intelligence budget (an estimated $7 billion a year) and the right to give assignments to all the agencies. Turner's position ultimately depends on the power realities of Washington and his own abilities.

No one who knows Stan Turner doubts that the driving, fiercely ambitious admiral will make the most of his new job. He is one of the armed services' new breed of activist intellectuals who pride themselves on their grasp of nonmilitary matters: politics, economics, psychology. Born in Highland Park, Ill., a Chicago suburb, Turner decided on a naval career instead of joining his father in real estate. After graduating 25th in his class at Annapolis (Jimmy Carter finished 59th out of 820 in the same class of '46), he studied at Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship. He served on a destroyer during the Korean War; from 1972 to 1974 he was president of the Naval War College, where he gained a reputation as a man of unconventional opinion. As he wrote in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, he preferred to "focus on trends rather than statistics."

Named commander of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic in 1974, Turner resorted again to unconventional tactics. He checked on the readiness of his ships by making surprise visits by helicopter. Then he would toss a life preserver into the ocean and order sailors to save a hypothetical man overboard. His ambition was to become Chief of Naval Operations, but his plans were interrupted last March by his Commander in Chief. Since Turner remains in the Navy, he is accused by critics in the CIA of using the intelligence post as a steppingstone to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The truth is, he probably could have found a safer route.

Powers hearing sentence in Moscow (1960)

A world that does not cherish democracy.

Castro's Cuban troops firing at advancing rebels during ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion (1961)

Taking the rap for a series of secret operations that were approved by higher-ups.

At the office through long days and into the night (his average work day is 12 hours), Turner spends his remaining time with his wife Patricia at their home in northwest Washington. His son Geoffrey is a Navy lieutenant stationed in Monterey, Calif. Daughter Laurel is married and lives in San Diego. Turner, who seldom drinks and does not smoke, likes to play tennis and squash or swim when he has the chance. His social life usually involves old friends from the Navy, not new ones from the CIA.

Turner's difficulties at the agency come, at least in part, from his carrying out the duties assigned to him. It has been common wisdom in recent years that the CIA had become too large. Staff reductions began under James Schlesinger, who was director in 1973, and continued under his successor, William Colby. When Turner took over, he found various options on his desk for eliminating some 1,500 positions over five or six years. Rather than leave people in suspense for so long a period, he decided to make a quick cut of 820 jobs over two years.

He did it none too diplomatically. With scant regard for the feelings of people who had served their country unsung for decades, he permitted a photocopied memo informing 212 employees of their dismissal to be distributed last Oct. 31. Some of the people fired thought he bore them a personal grudge. Says one of his former aides: "Stan is deeply suspicious of the clandestine services. He is very uncomfortable with their basic uncontrollability. He doesn't like their fine clothes and accents, their Cosmos and Yale and Georgetown clubs. They're simply not good sailors. He finds them sneeringly elliptical. It drives him crazy. He just can't get hold of this maddening quicksilver."

Turner could not have been pleased with his victims' undisciplined response. They dubbed the occasion the "Halloween massacre" and passed around a takeoff of the admiral's song in Gilbert and Sullivan's *H.M.S. Pinafore:*

"Of intelligence I had so little grip
That they offered me the directorship.
With my brassbound head of oak so stout
I don't have to know what it's all about."

Only 45 people, in fact, have been fired outright. Others have been retired, and the CIA personnel office is looking for Government jobs for the rest. Sums up Turner on the agency's cutbacks: "What do you want—happy spies or effective and well-controlled spies? The gripes are mainly from those who were asked to leave. It is ironic that the media are so enthusiastic about all those good old experienced spies—who brought all those things that the media railed against for all those years."

The CIA boss has support where it counts the most. At the signing of the executive order last week, Carter went out of his way to stress "my complete appreciation and confidence in Admiral Stan Turner." Carter sees Turner more often than previous Presidents saw their CIA chiefs. The admiral has briefed the President once or twice a week in hour-long sessions, usually alone. Turner prepares the agenda and spends ten to twelve hours reading background material for each session. According to a presidential aide: "Carter likes Turner's crispness, his grasp, his 'yes sir, no sir,' no-nonsense naval officer's style."

All the furor over the CIA's real and putative misdeeds has obscured its solid accomplishments over many years. Except for rare periods of war, the U.S. did not even have an overall intelligence service until the Office of Strategic Services

continued

was created in 1942; it provided Americans with a hazardous and exhilarating cram course in espionage. OSS members formed the nucleus of the CIA, which was started in 1947 in response to Soviet expansionism. The agency attracted talented recruits from campuses in the 1950s, and its activities spread adventurously, and occasionally recklessly.

Now, as the 1980s approach, what kind of CIA can—and should—the nation have? To hear Turner and other intelligence authorities, the agency will be smaller, with more sharply focused analysis, and with covert operations scaled down and sparingly used.

While the quality of CIA analysis in general is not what it used to be, the agency is still unsurpassed in interpreting technological data. The American public was exposed to the awesome possibilities of aerial espionage when a U-2 spy plane was brought down over the Soviet Union in 1960, and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was put on trial and jailed for two years. Since then the U-2 has been supplemented by an ever expanding array of observation satellites and eavesdropping devices. As a senior member of the National Security Council puts it, "The agency is best when there's something very specific that you want to know, preferably a question that can be answered with numbers, or, if not with numbers, then at least with nouns. The fewer adverbs and adjectives in a CIA report, the better it tends to be." But since this is a world of adverbs and adjectives—that is, of emotions that cannot be measured scientifically—more subjective analysis is needed. "We're neglecting soft input, the human factor," says a top foreign policy adviser to the White House. "There is insufficient keen political analysis."

White House officials complain, perhaps excessively, that the agency has failed to give them advance warning of crucial developments. Why, they ask, was the CIA not better informed about the reaction Vance would receive when he took his SALT proposals to Moscow last March. Common sense, however, might have indicated that the Secretary would run into trouble because the proposals were too sweeping to be acceptable to the Soviets. The White House felt that the CIA should have had some inkling of Sadat's decision to go to Israel; yet U.S. intelligence had warned that Sadat was frustrated and looking for a bold step. The CIA had satellite photos of a secret South African nuclear facility in the Kalahari Desert, but had not interpreted them. The White House was considerably embarrassed when it learned that the Soviets had already discovered the installation.

Vietnamese being led to CIA plane (1974)

New safeguards against excesses.

Policymakers sometimes fail to use sound intelligence when it is offered. President Johnson disregarded the discouraging CIA reports on Viet Nam; they were not what he wanted to hear. The White House rejected CIA warnings of a Middle East war in 1973. Why would the Arabs want to start a war they could not win? reasoned the policymakers. It did not occur to them that the Arabs could win something just by fighting better than they had the last time.

As the CIA has grown bigger, it has become more bureaucratic. Too much superfluous paper is circulated. Analysts are more conscious of job and status, and less daring and imaginative than they were in the '50s and '60s. Says an Administration official: "There's a lot of bureaucratic ass-covering that goes on when guys write long-range stuff. They don't want to be wrong, so they tend to be glib and platitudinous."

Though covert operations involving intervention in the internal affairs of other countries are being reduced, some have been successful. The CIA-backed overthrow of Iran's Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and of Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz the following year headed off threats of Communist takeovers and stabilized conditions to the benefit of the Western world. Other operations were more dubious. In the Dominican Republic, Dictator Rafael Trujillo was assassinated in 1961 by rebels supplied with guns by CIA agents. The ensuing chaos forced President Johnson to send in the Marines four years later. Notes New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck: "By using dirty tricks that backfired, we set ourselves up as the universal scapegoat for every disaster caused by either God or incompetent governments."

But not all covert CIA operations can—or should—be ruled out. "There is a mean, dirty, back-alley struggle going on in which many other governments are participating," says former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. "If we withdraw unilaterally, they aren't going to stop. We must maintain a first-rate covert capability."

Potential dangers exist in many parts of the world, especially where the ever expanding KGB is active. What if a revolutionary group with Soviet ties were plotting a coup against the government of Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening the world's oil supply? Surely the U.S. would need a clandestine force to support the legally constituted government and oppose such a disruptive act. Says former CIA Director Colby: "There really has to be something between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."

It is difficult to prescribe exact behavior for a covert undertaking. Strict rules of conduct could be damaging in certain situations. Suppose terrorists manage to obtain and hide an atomic weapon, then threaten to blow up a city—a not inconceivable happening in the decades ahead.

Allende in presidential palace (1973)

Hard to prescribe clear-cut rules.

Says Telford Taylor, a law professor who served in intelligence during World War II: "If the safety of a city were at stake, I'd say go ahead and burn up their toenails. Absolute morality is a little hard to swallow in this kind of thing."

But all agree that proper authority must be exercised over covert operations. It is much debated whether—and how much—successive Presidents knew about the various CIA projects; practically everyone else was kept in the dark. "I didn't learn about the Castro assassination plots until two years ago," admits Rusk. "That is intolerable. The Secretary of State must know what is going on. There has to be an inventory of ongoing things."

Yet former CIA Director John McCone, among many others, argues that only a few leaders of the Administration and Congress should be informed of sensitive intelligence projects, and other officials should be let in on secrets only if they "need to know." After the rush of disclosures about the CIA, everybody on Capitol Hill wanted to find out what the agency was doing. Oversight was spread among eight, sometimes sievelike, congressional committees. The eight still exist, but Turner increasingly is reporting to only two intelligence committees, one each in the House and Senate. The new executive order confirms this arrange-

continued

ment. The trend is toward reducing the number of people involved in oversight, though they will be more watchful than their predecessors in the '50s and '60s.

With the new supervision and tougher regulations, the national uproar over the CIA can be expected to subside. Damage has been done, but the U.S. intelligence community will survive. Jonathan Moore, director of the Institute of Politics at Harvard, feels that the attacks on the CIA might have "put us at a disadvantage under certain circumstances, but I'd put it in the category of runnable risks. After the debate is ended, after Chile, Viet Nam and Watergate, we say we are going to clean up our act, but we sure as hell are going to have an act. We might be more potent than before."

There even seems to be a swing of public opinion in support of the CIA, a recognition of the basic point that it is not a contradiction for an open democracy to have a secret intelligence agency. Senator Daniel Inouye, the Hawaii Democrat who formerly chaired the Senate intelligence committee, feels that: "If a poll were taken today, it would find spying is still essential. We hate wars, but we must maintain our defense posture. Our spies are not monsters." Nor will they be saints in a world and an occupation that produce very few. A certain realism and perspective is necessary. Intelligence must be recognized for what it is: occasionally dangerous, sometimes dirty, sometimes exhilarating, often tedious, very necessary work.

Turner: "I Will Be Criticized"

In an exclusive 90-minute interview, Stansfield Turner discussed the changing nature of spying with TIME *Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott.*

Excerpts:

On the mission of U.S. intelligence. American intelligence today is moving away from the two focuses of intelligence for its first 20 or 25 years [after World War II]. The first focus was on covert action, and the second was a preoccupation with the Soviet Union, particularly the military aspects of the Soviet Union. Let me not leave any doubt. The Soviet military is the No. 1 intelligence issue and must remain so. But without neglecting the cardinal line of defense, we've got to be able to tackle a much wider range of subjects. Today we've got to look at most of the 150-odd countries of the world. We have legitimate needs for good intelligence information on many of them. That transcends military matters. It gets into the economic as well as the political area. So the character of the whole organization has got to shift to accommodate these new factors.

On congressional oversight. There are clear risks in the process of oversight. The first is that we will end up with intelligence by timidity—we won't take any risks because somebody might criticize us. The second is exposure. If you have too many people viewing a sensitive operation, it may become publicly known and cost somebody's life or abort the operation ... I'd like to see us notify fewer committees of Congress; now we technically report to eight of them.

On the changing demand for covert action. I don't think the country wants us to interfere as much in other people's affairs by covert means today as in the past. I don't think it's as effective today as in the past—and it wasn't all that effective then. The batting average is not big league.

But I'm dedicated to preserving for this country the capability to turn to political action when it suits the purpose and when it is properly authorized. We have not by any means abandoned covert action. While it has been much scaled down from the height of the '50s and '60s, it does continue.

On how a covert action is undertaken. I'm not the guy who should push covert action. I'm not a policymaker, but if someone who is a policymaker asks, "Turner, what can you do for us in the way of covert action here?" I like to reach in my pocket and have a plan there, ready. A couple of times it [a plan] has been accepted. But on the whole I have not found it a very attractive option.

On clandestine financing of foreign political forces. Let's say Country X is having an election tomorrow, and we like Party A but don't like Party B. If we go into that Country and start feeding money to people in Party A, even assuming we're totally free of leaks in the U.S., there's still a high probability that there'll be a leak in Country X.

You could say that we got away with it in the past, but today you probably wouldn't get the politicians in Party A in Country X to accept the money, for fear it would become public knowledge and they'd lose more than they'd gain.

So I'm saying that some of the tools that have been used in the past have different effectiveness in a different world climate. Evidence of external tampering, particularly from one of the major powers, has tremendous internal ramifications that it didn't have 25 years ago.

On the proposal that a separate agency be set up to conduct covert operations. That would be costly and perhaps dangerous. You would end up constructing an organization, with people overseas, just for covert action, whereas today we get dual service out of people [those in covert operations engage in intelligence gathering as well]. If there were a separate bureaucracy with good people in it, they would end up promoting covert action —not maliciously, but because they would be energetic. We should be ready to do what we're asked to do, but not be out drumming up business.

On assassination. I am categorically prohibited from doing it. If we were in some *extremis* situation where it was justified to take human life for a good cause, like a hijacking, why, at least we could get the President to make an exception. Now, if it [the presidential prohibition] becomes law, we are going to have to be very precise on how that law is worded so we don't get into an absolutely absurd situation. But nobody wants to do assassinations.

On paramilitary operations. We are retaining a paramilitary capability on stand-by as part of our covert action kit.

On antiterrorism and antinarcotics operations. We have put more emphasis on both in this past year by allocating some increase of resources and by re-emphasizing to our chiefs of station that those objectives are high on our list. We have had some important successes. We have been able to abort intended terrorist operations from time to time by alerting people to them.

On the CIA's policy of making some of its studies public. I'm just so proud of what we have contributed in the past nine months to the public debate on major issues. Look at this morning's newspaper: there's a long story on Soviet oil-extraction problems. We triggered that last April by releasing a study on Soviet oil. We've put out several studies on the Soviet economy and its prospects, a study on the world energy situation, a study on terrorism. All these have given the taxpayer a greater return on his investment in intelligence. I intend to keep on with this program. I will be criticized sometimes for supporting the Administration's policy and sometimes for not supporting it. I'm doing neither. I'm giving the information we have.

(cont.)

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6 February 1978

Nation

KGB: Russia's Old Boychiks

The Soviet secret service is getting bigger—and better

Panama City, Fla., 1971: Carrying a hefty attaché case, U.S. Air Force Sergeant Walter T. Perkins walks to a commercial jet destined for Mexico City, where he plans to rendezvous with an agent of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service. In the attaché case are top-secret U.S. plans for defense against a Soviet air attack. Air Force security men arrest Perkins as he boards, and his KGB contact, Oleg Shevchenko, flees Mexico for Cuba.

Damascus, Syria, 1974: Hidden KGB cameras click softly, and a secret microphone records the tender dialogue as an Arab diplomat dallies with a male paramour in the city's infamous Turkish baths. Threatened afterward with disclosure of his homosexuality, the diplomat agrees to pass information to the KGB.

Jerusalem, 1976: The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church makes his pilgrimage from Moscow to the Russian Orthodox Church in Israel, the sole building in that country allowed to remain in Soviet hands after Israel's 1967 break with the U.S.S.R. Accompanying the Patriarch on his mission, as usual, is a squad of KGB agents bearing communications equipment and funds for local agents. Vladimir Ribakov, the administrative manager of the church in Jerusalem, is the KGB's chief agent in Israel.

These are only a few of the thousands of known incidents that shed a sliver of light on the sweep of Soviet intelligence activities round the world. Western authorities view the KGB as a worthy and persistent foe. Says a former high CIA and State Department official: "They're a lot better than we think: I think they're damn good."

The KGB's budget has grown to an estimated $10 billion (*v.* the $7 billion that the U.S. spends on the CIA, NSA and other intelligence agencies), and its roster, which approaches half a million employees, has grown dramatically since 1974. Western experts believe it has five times as many people involved in foreign intelligence as the CIA and Western European spy agencies combined.

A major European intelligence service claims 24% of the Soviet diplomats accredited to embassies in Western Europe are KGB agents; there are 87 such agents accredited in West Germany, 53 in Italy and 98 in Finland. About 35% of the 136 diplomats accredited to the Soviet embassy in Washington are believed to be KGB agents, and others serve as Tass correspondents, trade representatives and employees of the Soviet airline Aeroflot.

International agencies, including the U.N., are another favorite KGB cover. European intelligence experts estimate that 105 to 135 KGB agents are assigned to the U.N. in Europe. One is Alexander Benyaminov, appointed in 1976 to the data processing section of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a post that puts him in contact with those who possess nuclear secrets. Often the Soviet ambassador to a country is a full-fledged KGB agent. In Greece, he is Ivan Udaltsov, who, while serving as counselor at the Soviet embassy in Prague, helped to crush the Czech reform regime of Alexander Dubček in 1968. Three months after he arrived in Athens in 1976, Ambassador Udaltsov was accused of funneling $25 million to the Greek Communist Party; unfazed, he called a press conference to declare: "I was not upset by those reports. The KGB is a highly respected organization set up by Lenin to protect the socialist revolution and the Soviet state."

TASS/SOVFOTO

KGB's Andropov (standing, center), Trade Minister Patolichev (left) and Foreign Minister Gromyko with Brezhnev in 1976

They fear they will be blamed for missing something.

Indeed it is. The KGB center, as its command complex of buildings is called, is located only a few blocks from the Kremlin—at 2 Dzerzhinsky Square. The dour, ocher-colored buildings look down on the Bolshoi Theater and the entrance to Red Square. The agency has a huge network of informers within the U.S.S.R., and it can often veto applications for new jobs, visas and university admissions. It operates prison camps and mental hospitals and directs the Soviet campaign against dissidents. Lubyanka Prison, where victims of Stalin's purges, such as Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, were executed, is part of the 2 Dzerzhinsky Square complex of buildings.

The KGB (the Russian abbreviation for Committee for State Security) is a descendant of secret police agencies maintained over the centuries by anxious Russian czars; after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the Communists called their secret police, successively, the CHEKA, GPU, OGPU, GUCB/NKVD and MGB, the KGB's forerunner. Today the agency has a force of 300,000 men under arms to guard Soviet borders, as well as a corps of customs agents. Intourist too works closely with the KGB; tourist guides can steer chosen visitors to restaurants that have hidden microphones.

The KGB's boss, Yuri Andropov, took command in 1967, and in 1973 became the first KGB head since Stalin's dreaded Lavrenti Beria to join the ruling Politburo. Andropov, 63, is said to admire modern art and to be a witty conversationalist who speaks fluent English—a portrait that contrasts with his harsh actions as Moscow's Ambassador to Hungary during the 1956 uprising. Under Andropov, says one Western analyst, "the thugs are being weeded out of the KGB."

The KGB recruits from the elite of the Soviet Union's managerial class by means of an Old Boychik network. Picked for loyalty, intelligence, presence and family connections to the party and the agency, KGB recruits are often sent to Moscow's prestigious Institute for International Studies for intensive courses in foreign cultures and languages. KGB agents are given preference for scarce apartments in Moscow and buy such rare foreign goods as stereos and Scotch at giveaway prices. They socialize with each other and often intermarry.

"The really boring Russian diplomats are not KGB," says one Western intelligence agent. The KGB man often wears Western suits (veterans of U.S. service favor Brooks Brothers). He—or she—entertains freely, and spends more money than non-KGB apparatchiks.

Abroad, the most sociable KGB agents pose not only as diplomats but also as trade representatives and journalists. Their mission: gathering scientific and technical as well as military and political information. It is pursued directly by inviting employees, journalists and politicians to lunch or parties, and also by co-

In the field, KGB agents prepare annual plans that project, among other

continued

things, the number of collaborators they will recruit in the coming year; their performance is judged against the plan. Blackmail is a favorite recruitment tactic, with sex and drugs the standard come-ons, but sometimes other pressure is applied as well. Last month Iranian Major General Ahmed Mogharebi confessed that he had spied for the KGB after Soviet agents threatened to reveal his past membership in Iran's outlawed Communist Party, Tudeh. The leader of the Iranian spy ring, a government official named Ali-Naghi Rabbani, had sophisticated radio equipment for receiving Soviet satellite transmissions in his home. Rabbani's clandestine contact was the Soviet consul in Tehran, Boris Kabanov, who was expelled from the country. Both Mogharebi and Rabbani were sentenced to death; late last month Mogharebi was executed by a firing squad.

Colonel Rudolf Abel

In the Soviet Union, the KGB attempts on occasion to entrap foreign diplomats and journalists, especially ones it wishes to expel. When he was working for U.P.I., Christopher Ogden, now a TIME correspondent, was invited to a mysterious street-corner meeting in Moscow in 1973. He was offered the "secret plans" for a Soviet troop crossing into China. He declined them.

Kim Philby

Because most of the KGB's effort is aimed at free and open Western societies, KGB tacticians stress the use of agents on the ground, instead of electronic intelligence gathering, at which the U.S. is stronger. The KGB excels at recruiting new agents: with only some exaggeration, a West German intelligence expert says, "There is not one place in the world where the KGB does not have its man." Indeed, Superspy Colonel Rudolf Abel, apprehended in New York in 1957, was found to command a vast network of agents that ranged over the entire North American continent. Today the KGB cooperates closely with the East German Ministry for Security, which in 1972 successfully planted an agent, Günter Guillaume, as a close aide to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume spirited NATO defense and other secrets out of West Germany until his arrest in 1974. Last year French counterintelligence (the DST) broke up a spy ring that gave the Soviets information about the advanced Mirage-2000 fighter plane and NATO defenses. Israeli officials were shocked in 1972 when they deciphered the code used for radio transmissions between Cyprus, the KGB's Middle East headquarters, and Moscow, and discovered the Soviets had obtained full details of a planned Israeli retaliation raid against Syria. Damascus had the plan four hours before the scheduled Israeli raid.

Of course the Soviets have had their share of intelligence failures. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the KGB failed to detect Israeli preparations for crossing the Suez Canal, and underestimated the maneuver's importance once it was under way. In New Delhi, the resident KGB team concluded that Indira Gandhi would easily win re-election in 1977. More embarrassing was the gambit of Vladimir Rybachenko, who served in Paris as a UNESCO official. Shortly before Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Paris on a good-will visit in 1976, Rybachenko was caught receiving secret documents that described a French Defense Ministry computer system. Rybachenko was expelled. Then there was the gift by Colonel Vassili Denisenko, the Soviet military attaché in Switzerland, to an undercover KGB spy of 13 years. Denisenko gave a pair of golden cuff links bearing the hammer-and-sickle crest to Swiss Brigadier General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire. When Jeanmaire wore them, Swiss security agents had their first clue to his treachery; he was sentenced to an 18-year prison term.

Western analysts believe the KGB has several flaws that result from its enormous size and the Soviets' authoritarian mentality. KGB agents overcollect, flooding the district and home offices with so much data that the agency does not or cannot efficiently separate the significant from the trivial. This may explain why, according to a defector, KGB field men in the Middle East reported on Israel's plan to strike Egypt in 1967, but the word never got to Egypt. The society that creates KGB inefficiencies is also an enormous advantage to the agency, permitting it great latitude without measurable objection from its populace. After all, the agency is charged with silencing domestic critics, including any who would make so bold as to criticize the KGB. ■

General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire

Spy Guide

When students of the gray world gather, the conversation—whispered, of course—often turns to the quality of intelligence services. The CIA and KGB rank, on a scale of 1 to 4, at the top. Here, with help from intelligence operatives in the U.S. and abroad, TIME *rates the other services:*

Israel. Mossad, its intelligence service, is very well organized, ruthless, dedicated, all but impossible to infiltrate. Excels at information gathering and counterintelligence, is weaker on political analysis. Major target: Arab countries, naturally.

Britain. Its Secret Intelligence Service is tops at analytical work and political judgments. Good on the Middle East, less impressive on Africa. Master Spy Kim Philby's exposure as a KGB agent in 1963 was a blow, but SIS has overcome that.

Czechoslovakia and Poland. Their services are best in the East, after the KGB. The Czechs' main target: Britain, where it has 50 spies in London embassy. Poles tend to move and mix better internationally.

West Germany. Bonn's Bundesnachrichtendienst is superb on East Germany and on analyzing other Warsaw Pact countries. Reputation tarnished by penetration of Soviet and East German spies into government ministries.

France. The SDECE has some bright leaders and operates well in certain areas, notably former French West Africa. Suffers from internal squabbling and is thought to be penetrated by Communist agents.

Japan. Tokyo's Cabinet Research Office aims to gather information about foreign countries' economic-policy intentions and industrial secrets. Political analysis is weak.

China. The General Administration of Intelligence operates mostly in Asia, Africa and in centers of Overseas Chinese. Technologically weak, but sound on analysis. Especially concerned with Soviet industrial development in Siberia.

Norway and Sweden. Both sound on Soviet Union, but Norway has edge, with access to NATO intelligence.

Canada and Australia. Minor league worldwide, stronger regionally.



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